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Abstract
Equality in taxation is a problem much discussed because of the importance 
that taxes play in the lives of individual citizens. However, it is a problem impossible 
to solve through methods of implementation. Rather, it is an issue of occasion and 
convenience, and therefore, mechanism. This thesis uses the specific historical ex-
ample of the crown government of Edward I of England as a resource of understand-
ing. The reign of Edward I was a period where questions involving the equality and 
right of taxation were posed, and the king answered them popularly, which con-
tributed to a wildly successful reign. However, unlike more politicized attempts at us-
ing the past to verify drawn conclusions in the modern era, this thesis looks to allow 
history to address the problem itself. A plethora of historical authorities both primary 
and secondary to the study of Edward I and a wide variety of studies on the philoso-
phy and development of the modern U.S. Tax system were used to draw conclusions 
from the past to benefit our current perspective. The results of this research yielded 
the following conclusions: that a traditional policy of taxation and popular acceptance 
to any change in that policy, temporary or permanent, are necessary for general ac-
ceptance of any tax burden. This would require a new perspective in regards to how 
we relate taxes to the individual. Likewise, the tax system of the United States would 
require alteration before either of these principles were put into effect creating an ex-
traordinary rippling effect throughout the entire governmental process. However, if 
the conclusions drawn can ascend into popular acceptance, it would be a worthy ef-
fort to make.
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Introduction: The Challenge of Taxation
Taxes are a necessary burden to any who wish to live in a society governed 
by law and order. However, the implementation is always contested and the princi-
ples that govern tax law are deeply rooted in politics and the constant changing of 
the political climate. The economic philosopher Adam Smith laid out his famous four 
maxims of taxation in The Wealth of Nations. The first principle, equality, meant that all 
citizens must pay tax according to their respective ability to pay. The second, certain-
ty, declared that individuals should know the amount of payment due so as to avoid 
corruption among the collectors. The third principle, convenience, stated that taxes 
should be levied at time that is most convenient for the contributor to pay. The fourth 
and final principle asserted that taxes should be as small as possible so as not to 
hinder private enterprise or create waste in government (Smith, 1776, p. 263-264). 
Such principles are necessary in developing a framework to govern how taxes 
should be implemented. Even still, there is always controversy surrounding how to 
interpret principles such as Adam Smith’s.
The most difficult of these to implement, of course, is equality. In truth, there is 
no such thing, or at least, no way to reach consensus on what equality in taxation 
looks like. The socialist would wish to increase taxes on the rich and decrease taxes 
on the poor. The conservative would prefer a decrease in taxes, especially on the 
rich and perhaps the implementation of a flat tax. Smith himself admitted that any tax 
levied only on a single source of revenue is unequal and hints at the possibility of 
taxation on all forms of revenue (Smith, 1776, p. 263). However, if such a tax were 
implemented, like the federal income tax of the United States, how could anyone 
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compare the equality of the tax levied on each form of revenue? Likewise, Smith 
does not attempt to explain his vision of an objective method to determine how much 
tax people of different income should pay. Perhaps all profits collected above a cer-
tain threshold considered a comfortable wage should be apprehended by the gov-
erning authority. After all, does anyone really need millions of dollars of income? Or 
perhaps the fairest tax is simply a percentage of income earned. After all, how can 
someone argue that it is fair to tax anyone at a higher percentage just because they 
are more successful financially than anyone else? In the course of modern history, 
most governments have opted for a progressive income tax that is essentially a 
compromise between the two schools of thought (Bartlett, 2012, p. 60). However, 
this has only calmed the debate slightly as people continue to run for high public of-
fices on their opinions of what constitutes a fair tax.
To address the problem of defining equality, it is prudent to look back at a pe-
riod where similar questions surrounding the fairness of taxation occurred and were 
addressed in a successful manner. The reign of Edward I of England is one such pe-
riod of history following the disastrous reign of his father, Henry III, and grandfather, 
John, where the power of the English crown was challenged and the right of the king 
to levy taxes against his people was questioned. Edward I responded to the uncer-
tainty with strategic and prudent action that led to arguably the most successful and 
transformative reign in medieval English history. Likewise, in addressing the chal-
lenge of taxation, the reign of Edward I provides great insight into funding the needs 
of a country without dividing the population along political lines. The conclusions 
yielded can be expressed in two points: that a traditional tax policy should be creat-
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ed by a form of convention, and that all new taxes should be levied only after the 
general population provides its acceptance.
Governmental Revenues of Edward I
Streams of Revenue
Edward I’s crown did not solely rely on taxation, though his ambitions forced 
him to rely on taxation more than he might have liked. Nonetheless, a substantial 
part of his revenues came in the form of personal revenues from his own estates 
and loans from Italian bankers.
By the time of Edward’s reign, the traditional revenues raised from the king’s 
own holdings were insufficient to match expenses. Indeed, by this time profits from 
crown lands could scarcely amount to more than £14,000 throughout the entire year 
(Mills, 1925, p. 231). Considering that at times Edward’s crown government required 
sums of £751 a week or £39,052 a year, it was impossible for traditional revenues to 
meet budgetary needs (Prestwich, 1972, p. 204). Because of this, what was tradi-
tionally thought to be the main revenue source of the crown needed to be not only 
supplemented, but effectively replaced by newer and greater sources of revenue.
Early on in Edward’s reign it was Italian bankers, the international financiers 
of the age, which would provide him with the bulk of the necessary resources. As 
Morris (2015) explained, Edward had met these bankers, the Riccardi of Lucca, in 
route to the Holy Land during his crusade, and grew increasingly reliant on their 
loans during the early part of his reign (p. 123). This reliance, however, could only 
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continue if the Riccardi had reason to lend money to the crown; and what attracted 
them to England was the thriving wool trade. They proved to be more than excited to 
do business with all sorts of Englishmen, at one point being owed £20,007 from var-
ious people in England excluding the crown (Prestwich, 1972, p. 206). For Edward, 
loans provided a method of raising necessary funds quickly during times of emer-
gency. For the Riccardi, they would receive interest at rates nearing thirty-three per-
cent (Morris, 2015, p. 124). It might seem overly expensive to utilize loans as fre-
quently as Edward did. After all, was expedience really worth thirty-three percent in-
terest? For Edward, however, the most important thing about the Riccardi is that 
their loans did not require the consent of Edward’s subjects.
That, of course, was the major hurdle Edward faced when petitioning for tax-
es. As T.F. Tout (1896) explained, Edward was power-hungry, but understood the 
necessity of entering into a partnership with his subjects (p. 123). However, his sub-
jects cared little about his policies unless they affected them directly. For the peas-
antry, wars in Wales did little to upset them. For the barony, Edward’s wars were a 
welcomed method of securing new lands and titles. That is, as long as they were 
wars of conquest that might personally endow them. However, wars in the French 
province of Gascony fought over the king’s own lands outside the Kingdom of Eng-
land did little to please them. Moreover, taxes raised for wars in France were a sure 
way to unite the nobility and commoners against an English king. In 1296, enough 
frustration led to the threat of Civil War after the marshal of England refused the 
king’s call to arms (Morris, 2015, p. 295-296).
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These sorts of events did not happen often, however. Unlike his father, Ed-
ward seldom experienced the disunity or strife that afflicted Henry III throughout his 
long reign. This was because Edward recognized the limitations facing him and 
wielded what traditional rights he held with competency and grace. Taxes would be-
come one of Edward’s major sources of income. Parliament would become his most 
trusted ally in securing the consent of his people to obtain tax revenues.
Popular Ascent
The nature of late medieval parliamentary procedure is very much a mystery 
to modern historians. M.V. Clarke (1964) went so far as to say, “we are left to guess 
in the dark,” (p. 2). Nonetheless, research regarding the procedures of early English 
parliaments must consult one particularly misunderstood document known as the 
Modus Tenendi Parliamentum. This misunderstanding comes not only from the doc-
ument itself, but also how we have received the document. We lack the date and au-
thor of the Modus, and we have too many versions of the manuscript (Weber, 1998, 
p. 149). This ambiguity has caused many historians to either reject the document or 
ignore it altogether.
Yet, what intrigues Clarke and even those in doubt of the document’s useful-
ness are the contents of the Modus Tenendi Parliamentum. This grand old document 
describes in great detail the summoning procedure, who was summoned, where the 
king and his clerks would sit amongst the parliament, and how parliament was car-
ried out and why (Hardy, 1846). The descriptive nature of the document suggests 
that the author or authors had some understanding of the goings-on of late medieval 
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English parliaments because what can be verified is the authors’ understanding of 
the nature of summonses. Two burgesses both “discreet and capable of laboring” 
were to be “elected without delay” to appear at Edward I’s 1295 parliament accord-
ing to a writs of summons to the sheriff of Northampton (Halsall, 1996). Likewise, the 
Modus suggested that “two fit, honorable, and experienced burgesses,” were to be 
elected to parliament (Hardy, 1846, p. 12). When comparing the other procedures of 
summoning the barons and bishops there exist similarities in both structure and con-
tent between the actual writs of summons and the summoning described in the 
Modus.
Of course, verification in partiality cannot be equated with verification on the 
whole. However, partial verification does suggest that the author intended to de-
scribe reality and not his or her own imaginative vision of what parliament might 
have been. Therefore, at the very least, the Modus is something to consider. Cer-
tainly for the great biographer of Edward I, Michael Prestwich, the Modus was some-
thing to take very seriously. Indeed, Prestwich not only used the document in his 
scholarship, but speculated to the date and possible authorship of the manuscript (p. 
444).
For purposes of taxation, the Modus described the limitations of taxation on 
the king as well as the role of the representatives of the shires, towns, and burgess-
es in decisions on the matter. Firstly, the king was only permitted to petition his sub-
jects for aid in circumstances of war, the knighting of the king's sons, and the marry-
ing of the king's daughters. Secondly, the consensus of two shire knights or, “in like 
manner the procurators of the clergy of a single bishopric,” outweigh the opposite 
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opinion of an earl or bishop respectively (p. 40). Essentially, the Modus confirmed 
that the king only had certain powers to tax and that the persons sitting in parliament 
had voices of near equality while parliament was being held. Moreover, the Modus 
previously declared that, “all peers are judges and justices,” (p. 40). In respect to 
popular ascent, the Modus quite clearly holds an idealistic view of parliamentary co-
operation between the various classes of people involved. To whoever wrote the 
manuscript, parliament was an extraordinary occurrence insulated from the wealth 
and station that divided those in attendance during their normal lives.
However, to the engineers of late medieval parliament, the Modus’ conclusion 
only confirmed what had been assured by Edward I himself. The king’s writ of sum-
mons to the archbishop of Canterbury during the year 1295 stated, “that what affects 
all, by all should be approved,” (Halsall, 1996). The summons could easily have only 
addressed the exalted men of England or the peers of the realm. Instead, Edward 
was absolutely inclusive. “All” didn’t refer to only the bishops and barons. “All” re-
ferred to the entirety of the English population. If not, there would be no reason of 
including representatives of the shires, boroughs, and towns at all. Likewise, if this 
was a false claim by a king hoping to pacify a troubled peasantry, then attendance 
from outside the English peerage would certainly have been low, which is not the 
case when considering J.G. Edwards exhaustive study on parliamentary attendance 
of the medieval common representatives during the reigns of Edward I and Edward 
II (p. 166-167).
Likewise, Edward I went on to inspire nationalism to support his cause in 
Gascony by claiming the French king’s plans against Edward extended beyond his 
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French holdings and into the Kingdom of England (Halsall, 1996). Very clearly Ed-
ward wanted parliament to be not only representative, but unifying, therefore sup-
porting the idea that parliament acted as a bridge between the crown, the crown’s 
vassals, the clergy, and the common folk of England. Taken together with the Modus, 
it can be reasonably assumed that either parliament was such a bridge or that the 
king’s propaganda worked well enough for parliament to be perceived as such.
It should be noted that Edward was not a visionary, but rather an agent of re-
ality. His idealistic rhetoric and continual reliance on parliament should not be taken 
at face value. His royal authority had been challenged often and violently through 
civil war and political upheaval during the reigns of the past two kings. Without taking 
into account the demands of the barons in the Magna Carta and Provisions of Ox-
ford, Edward could have faced the same crippling problems that led to the frustra-
tions and catastrophes of his father and grandfather. King John, whose reign 
spurned the barons into rebellion that forced him to accept the Magna Carta, faced 
many of the same problems that Edward faced. However, what separated him from 
Edward and the Angevin kings before him was his unwillingness to interact with his 
subjects. He did not lack ambition or even cleverness, but he lacked charisma and 
trust. So, when when faced with economic ruin, John wielded his powers to tax im-
perially and used fines and other judicial measures to raise revenues without the 
consent of his subjects (McGlynn, p. 13-14). This was the root cause of the Magna 
Carta drafted in 1215, which demanded that no aid or scutage be levied without the 
“common counsel of the realm,” (Holt, 383). One hundred years later, his grandson, 
Edward, would not forget.
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To accept one perspective as reality would be wrong. However, in the ab-
sence of other alternative descriptions of late medieval parliamentary procedure, the 
Modus confirms what Edward I attempted to sell parliament as: a body of individuals 
speaking for the whole of England. It certainly made sense for Edward to utilize such 
a body of individuals because it formalized the consent of his subjects demanded by 
the Magna Carta. Considering this, it must be tentatively accepted that at the very 
least late medieval English parliaments were a measured attempt at compromise 
between the crown and its subjects. In effect, it was a medieval referendum.
Edwardian Taxation
Clerical taxes were the most radical form of taxation imposed throughout Ed-
ward’s reign. He certainly wasn’t the only king, nor the only English king, to impose 
taxes on the clergy; but that he taxed heavily and often was troublesome to the 
Catholic Church in England. Archbishop of Canterbury Winchelsea proved to be an 
effective and capable foil to Edward. On multiple occasions, the archbishop stymied 
Edward’s attempts to levy taxes on the clergy. Once, he even had Edward’s own 
minister impeached from office (Stubbs, 1968, p. 490). Despite these occasions of 
victory, Winchelsea was eventually defeated by Edward when, upon the ascension 
of Pope Clement V, Winchelsea was relieved of his position (Morris, 2015, p. 352). 
Despite the frequent controversy, taxes collected from the clergy were impressive. 
£101,000 was collected in 1295 and £22,810 in 1297 despite Winchelsea’s resis-
tance during the later collection (Prestwich, 1972, p. 187).
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Edward also looked to more traditional forms of war taxes, specifically tal-
lages, or land taxes imposed during times of conflict, and feudal aid granted for the 
marriage of the king’s daughter. However, when these were implemented, little was 
yielded (Prestwich, 1972, p. 184-185). Lastly, scutages, or fines issued when a man 
could not answer a military summons, were issued in 1305. However, only £400 was 
collected due much to hostility towards the antiquated fine (Prestwich, 1972, p. 185).
Edward’s most effective form of taxation was assessed on the value of move-
able property. According to James T. Willard (1934), moveable property was never 
specifically identified, but essentially meant animals, produce, and household goods 
(p. 517). It was not a tallage, or traditional land tax, certainly because of the protes-
tation of the barons in the Magna Carta (Britannica, 1878, p. 29). It must have been 
accepted because moveable property was inherently temporary. Nothing could be 
taxed that might be passed down from generation to generation, especially consider-
ing that such tax was only levied against men with property valued above a certain 
threshold (Willard, 1934, p. 517).
Despite its popularity, taxes on moveables had one glaring issue. Every tax 
required a new assessment. A moveables tax of a fifteenth in 1275 could be valued 
at £81,054 and £49,755 in 1301 (Prestwich, 1972, p. 179-180). How could such a 
variation in wealth occur in a country in just twenty-six years? Obviously, it wasn’t a 
change in wealth, but a change in assessment. Assessors could be treated or bribed 
to make lower assessments and collectors might pocket coin under the table and 
blame the assessors. A lack of a permanent method of valuation made taxes on 
moveable property a frustratingly inconsistent manner of taxation. If the king needed 
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twenty thousand pounds and only brought in ten thousand, his campaign might be 
doomed. If the king levied taxes at unpopular percentages, his authority might be 
questioned. Michael Prestwich (1972) noted that one method of reducing corruption 
of assessors and collectors was through positive incentives of heightened al-
lowances (p. 181). This dampened the volatility, but did not solve it.
There were other forms of taxes levied by Edward often fitting the moment in 
which they were levied. In 1275, Edward turned to customs duties on wool. During 
the Easter Parliament of that year, Edward was granted a tax of around three per-
cent on every sack of wool exported (Morris, 2015, p. 123). However, like all taxes 
only levied on a single industry, customs duties on wool were largely unpopular. 
Though levied on multiple occasions, Edward was met with opposition in nearly 
every occurrence. In fact, the crippling tax on wool exports contributed to the rhetoric 
of rebellion that nearly occurred in 1296 led by Edward’s own marshal (Prestwich, 
1972, p. 123). Nonetheless, Edward levied many customs duties and forced loans 
on various townships because wool was the main export of England and thus the 
greatest source of possible revenues. Strangely, some historians have suggested 
that Edward’s protective tariffs might have saved the English wool trade from foreign 
merchant dominance within the kingdom (Nightingale, 2013, p. 478). After all, why 
would foreign merchants suffer under the weight of Edwardian customs duties if they 
could leave the country?
Like all responsible and ambitious governors, Edward I was both careful and 
clever about how and where he collected the necessary funds to run his kingdom. 
The task was inherently onerous, but, as William Stubbs suggested, he was “very 
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economical,” (Stubbs, 1968, p. 488). He understood that a kingdom required 
tremendous resources to function, and he found ways to keep the kingdom running 
and purposeful. Nonetheless, despite an aggressive nature and appetite for con-
quest and war, he maintained a clear understanding of the limitations of his crown 
and its relation to his subjects as apparent in his frequent use of a tax that proved to 
be popular and required parliamentary approval for its implementation. For all its 
problems, Edwardian taxation pushed the most popular form of taxation to the fore-
front of the king’s policies. Taxes on moveable property proved to be the most impor-
tant revenue source for the king. Likewise, because Edward did not overstep many 
of his traditional rights to revenues through only collecting taxes and extraordinary 
tributes during times of conflict, he maintained the faith and goodwill of his subjects. 
Through careful observance of traditional law regarding taxes and calling for the 
consent of his subjects through parliament whenever he required funds outside of 
his royal rights, Edward was not only able to avoid the fate of his father and grandfa-
ther, but expand his realm, restore the prestige of the crown, and restore stability to 
a fracturing kingdom.
Implementation of Edwardian Taxation in the Modern United States
Problem of Representation
The representative legislature of the United States was established to provide 
law and order to the country along with the general support of the population. The 
republican nature of the United States government, as argued for in the Federalist 
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Papers and created through the Constitution, was preferred over direct democracy 
because a republic is governed by a small body of individuals who can provide vi-
sion, and it can govern a much larger land mass than can a democracy (Jay, Gold-
man, Hamilton, & Madison, 2008, p. 52). For Thomas Jefferson (1801), the republi-
can form of government was an absolute necessity during the years of his presiden-
cy when he declared in his first inaugural address that republicanism was “the 
world’s best hope,” (p. 2). Nonetheless, it was not the ideal form of government be-
cause it required an enlightened representative body to take the helm until a more 
perfect manifestation of governmental consent could be developed. The United 
States, forged in revolution and tempered through the Constitution, was a process; 
and republicanism, as it existed during Jefferson’s presidency, was merely a single 
step in that process. Eventually, Jefferson envisioned a self-governing populace 
molded by education and commitment to principles of liberty (Onuf, 2007, p. 172). 
Jeffersonian commitment to the consent of the governed was part of the ideological 
foundation that would become the United States of America.
However, there exists a great debate over how far the United States has 
come in promoting consent of the governed. Optimistically, Fred R. Harris (1995) 
concluded that, “The U.S. Congress is today… a place of largely well-motivated, 
well-prepared, and high-minded professional members, the world’s greatest deliber-
ative body, and… the citadel of America’s democracy,” (p. 143). Somewhere in the 
middle sits Sean Theriault (2005) who lamented that, “sometimes the people matter; 
sometimes they do not,” (p. 138). Vehemently in rejection that the U.S. Congress 
promotes representatives that faithfully govern based on the will of their constituents 
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is Robert A. Bernstein (1989) who not only referred to the idea as a myth, but con-
cluded that the myth is false (p. 104). At the heart of this argument is the question of 
representative responsiveness to the opinions of their constituents. Intuitively, con-
gressmen and congresswomen should be responsive or be voted out of office. How-
ever, the conclusions drawn by various scholars is mixed. Sean Theriault (2005), 
holding the most balanced position in the debate, proposed, that representatives are 
somewhat responsive to their constituents, but when they are not, they tend to es-
cape punishment by their constituents (p. 136-137). This lukewarm conclusion can 
be best explained by the expectations of Congress of being both a legislative body 
and a representative body (Sinclair, 2014, 705). This often discussed argument of 
Barbara Sinclair’s is wonderful because it proposes that Congress has two separate 
functions. Ultimately it fails at both considering the staggeringly low approval ratings 
of Congress and Congress’ partial adherence to its role as a representative body. 
This suggests a radical proposition: Congress should only have one major function.
In addressing the question of which major function, the reign of Edward pro-
vides great insight. The representative body of parliament was freshly elected for 
every occasion. Parliament had no legislative or executive powers and merely pro-
vided acceptance or rejection of the crown’s vision. Moreover, this parliament proved 
to be exceptionally responsive by promoting the most popular and effective tax in a 
time of significant controversy surrounding the king’s powers to tax his subjects.
For the contemporary United States, the natural function of Congress is to be 
the legislature. The general population would not support a president functioning as 
both a legislature and executive, like King Edward I. However, considering that Con-
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gress has been and remains the least popular branch of government with approval 
ratings ranging from 11% to 20% over the past three and one-half years, change 
should occur (McCarthy, 2016). If Congress’ only major junction becomes legislative 
and not representative, something else must fill the role of representative.
The answer lies in the American tax system. If a traditional basis of taxation 
were created through a convention with that singular purpose, and any change to 
that basis required the consent of the people through a referendum, Congress could 
focus on effective legislation, and the American people could accept or reject their 
vision being the body holding the purse-string of the federal government. In this vi-
sion, the American people would replace medieval parliament and the president and 
congress would replace the Edwardian crown government.
Referendum on Changes to American Taxation
The new role played by the people as their own representative body would 
not be extraordinary. Modern governments turn to referendums on occasion to 
gauge the will of their constituents or settle disputes within legislative and represen-
tative bodies. However, splitting the role of Congress and empowering the American 
people by giving them the power to dictate tax policy would be extraordinary, though 
not contrary to the will of at least one particular founding father. Thomas Jefferson 
envisioned an educated population that could effectively govern themselves. This 
would provide a path to such a lofty vision. After all, if the people voted time and 
again to restrict Congress to their current budget, perhaps there would be no place 
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for the federal government anymore, and the American people would thus be on the 
path to self-governance.
To consider such a proposition, it is imperative to imagine the necessary 
changes and steps that would have to occur to implement a system of referendums 
to effectively mold the American citizenry into their own representative body. First, a 
council of individuals consisting of appointees of the executive, legislative, and rep-
resentative bodies would be required to oversee referendums proposed by Con-
gress. Second, there should be a maximum number of tax referendums that can be 
called by Congress in a given period of time. An example might be once every quar-
ter with the logic being that Congress could theoretically call referendums very often 
to limit voter turnout and perhaps increase chances of a vote of acceptance. Third, 
the percentage of votes required to change tax law should be based on whether the 
proposed change is temporary or permanent. Lastly, there should be no quorum to 
validate referendum results because quorums incentivize the rejectors to not voice 
their opinion, creating lower voter turnout where quorum law exists (Conraria & Ma-
galhães, 2009).
Of course this is all contingent on the willingness of the people to be an active 
participant in their government in regards to taxation. On the surface, it appears ob-
vious that, “the aspect of government that directly affects more people than any oth-
er,” should cause Americans to take an active role in answering Congress’ plea for 
changes in taxation (Slemrod & Bakija, 2008, p. 2). However, for them to not only be 
active, but responsible requires the American people to understand their responsibili-
ty to the nation as a whole and the nation’s responsibility to them. After all, taxes are 
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what supply government with revenues and people tend to struggle to put value on 
what the government offers them: protection from foreign and domestic threats, edu-
cation, and a shared identity. To accept that the American people are capable of 
such a task is a great step, but one the government and people should be willing to 
take. After all, if Edward I was insightful enough to involve parliament to decide the 
fate of his governmental needs, so too should the government of the United States 
invite their people to the table.
As Parliament changed the nature of Edwardian government, so too would a 
system of referendum impact the nature of Congress. Obviously, Congress would 
still be an elected body. However, with their foremost purpose being lawmaking as 
opposed to representation, they would have new expectations laid at their feet. With 
legislation the main Congressional responsibility, efficiency and effectiveness would 
be the expectation. Gridlock and the slow and painstaking procedures required to 
even get a bill to the House or Senate floor, much less passed, would no longer be 
accepted. Even Harris (1995), the man who so vehemently defended Congress, de-
sired great procedural reforms in the Senate and committees because of the ineffi-
ciency of the Congressional legislation process (p. 110-127). If Congress no longer 
needed to worry about re-election through single-term limits and longer terms, Con-
gress could focus wholly on building a new method of hearing ideas, building laws, 
and passing them. The check to legislative authority would not only be from the ex-
ecutive, but from the citizens acting as their own representatives through control 
over federal taxation. For Congress to pass major legislation that also required ex-
tensive funding, they would be forced to convince the American people that their 
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new laws would benefit them more than it would cost them. They would have to ed-
ucate the American people on their vision, and what once might have been seen as 
a government wholly detached from its constituents would be reliant on its con-
stituents.
Establishment of a Traditional Tax Policy
Adam Smith’s (1776) second maxim of certainty is the most easily addressed 
problem in our current tax system (p. 263-264). In the United States, the complexity 
of the tax system costs the country $135 billion or 10 cents for every dollar of tax 
revenue (Slemrod & Bakija, 2008, p. 4). Complexity sounds like a different issue 
than certainty, but in reality it is not. If people are required to pour hours into their 
taxes in order to accurately calculate them, or pay someone else to do them, or get 
a family member to do them, then there most assuredly is a lack of certainty sur-
rounding what exactly is being taxed and how the tax revenues are being spent. 
Certainty is equal parts simplicity and transparency. Edward I achieved tax certainty 
through the frequent use of taxes on moveables, which were the most popular and 
well-understood form of taxation for the English people of the time. For the American 
people, the establishment of a traditional tax policy is imperative to achieving Smith’s 
maxim of certainty.
Complexity is simply a part of most modern tax systems; however, many 
economists believe that complexity in the United States tax system is uniquely ex-
treme, including Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija (2008, p. 164-165). Simplifying the tax 
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code would be step one to establishing an acceptable traditional basis of taxation. 
Two main steps would be required to simplify the tax code. The establishment of a 
single form of taxation, whether it be income tax or wealth tax or sales tax, would be 
step one. For the sake of familiarity, income tax seems to be a good option. It is al-
ready the flashpoint of most debates surrounding taxation, has been levied since the 
Civil War and permanently since the passage of the sixteenth amendment, and is 
part of modern American life.
Moreover, despite the current complexity of income taxation, the current sys-
tem can be simplified by simply destroying or severely limiting tax cuts of all kinds. 
Tax cuts are the chief cause of complexity and therefore the costly methods of calcu-
lating, collecting, and verifying tax payments. Moreover, they are simply an attempt 
at encouraging what government believes to be important in society whether that be 
children, education, or investing in technology (Marron, 2012, p. 152). However, as 
Slemrod and Blakija (2008) point out, the government can’t encourage every social 
virtue and in encouraging a handful, they’re effectively discouraging all other activi-
ties (p. 307). Yes, children are important, college education is important, but when 
the government steps into society to intervene on the behalf of individuals seeking 
college or a family, it is discouraging them from creating the relationships with their 
extended family and friends that once would have created the necessary avenues of 
achieving those goals. Effectively, tax cuts break down communal and familial bonds 
because the government becomes a crutch its citizens rely on. Why care about 
building relationships with those around you if the governmental safety net is there to 
lift you to whatever heights you want to achieve? Perhaps the answer is that you 
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missed out on opportunities of building relationships with people around you and iso-
lated yourself from a community that not only cares about you for political purposes, 
but on an intimate level.
Transparency is the more difficult hurdle to leap because it is impossible to 
expect the taxpayer to know how every dollar of tax revenue is spent. However, with 
the establishment of a tax policy, all taxes collected and spent beyond that basis 
would be accounted for because the legislation and the subsequent referendum 
would be part of the public record. A law regarding expansion of infrastructure would 
be directly attributable to the proposed tax and referendum required to pay for it. 
This doesn’t necessarily negate frustrations surrounding taxes of transparency. In 
fact, transparency would provide citizens the ability to debate whether a tax is ac-
ceptable or not because documentation of  the legislation and approved tax would 
be available long after the tax was approved. One of the reasons the debate over 
social security reform is still so heated is certainly because it is separated out from 
the rest of an individual’s tax liability (Slemrod & Bakija, 2008, p. 52-53). However, if 
Americans truly believe in the ideas of liberty and freedom of speech, then they 
should be happy about this effect of modern Edwardian tax reform.
Equality is an extremely important idea to consider when addressing funda-
mental change in the tax system; however, it is impossible to establish a tax code 
that is judged as fair by the public at large. A progressive tax is the smartest form of 
taxation, not because it is absolutely fair, but because it is effective. Wealthy people 
should pay a larger percentage of their income because they have the ability to pay, 
and government needs to draw revenue from the citizenry without causing unrest. 
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During the reign of Edward I, no man with wealth below a certain threshold would 
pay any tax on moveable property. Likewise, in 1316 during the reign of Edward II, 
one-third of the burghers of Shrewsbury that qualified to pay the tax on moveables 
were excused from taxation because of famine (Nightingale, 2004, p. 6). Quite obvi-
ously Edward I and Edward II understood that the poor could not afford tax. The 
United States should understand that also; and accordingly the traditional tax policy 
established by whatever governmental means would need to reflect that understand-
ing.
Conclusion
The process that started with looking to the past to find answers for today in 
regards to taxation became something entirely different when the answers discov-
ered involved the manners of which tax policy is adopted as opposed to policy in and 
of itself. If we attempted to draw conclusions from the model of taxation used during 
Edward’s age, the only possible conclusion to be drawn from the reign of Edward I 
was that taxes on moveables is the fairest and most acceptable form of taxation. 
However, this seemed unreasonable despite the obvious inclination to debate wealth 
taxes versus income taxes. What was much more interesting about Edward’s reign 
was how responsive his government was to the will of his subjects in relation to taxa-
tion. Taxes on moveables became the most effective revenue stream during Ed-
ward’s reign because the one-time locally elected, inherited, or appointed represen-
tatives of the people willed it so. In comparison to the modern day United States, the 
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responsiveness of Edward’s government was brilliant. Of course, he tinkered with 
less successful forms of raising revenues, but in the end, the most popular tax won 
out in a time spanning only a few years. His reign wasn’t just transformative because 
he was an ambitious and effective ruler. It was transformative because of his willing-
ness to invite his people to share in his vision or reject it.
Of course, making Congress into a strictly legislative body of elected officials 
and allowing the American citizenry to act as their own representatives through con-
trolling the tax system is a major step. However, as the debate rages on about which 
tax policy to adopt, I can’t help but wonder if the debate shouldn’t have already been 
settled. As long as Congress remains devoted to half-heartedly representing their 
ever-polarizing constituency, what the American people will receive is half-hearted 
tax reform and more tax cuts to encourage whatever type of behavior the govern-
ment deems virtuous. Simple, non-manipulative, and popular tax is what the United 
States needs. Whether or not adopting a traditional tax policy and forming the citi-
zenry into its own representative is possible is another question entirely. 
Even if it were possible, would it create the tax system that I might deem most 
equal? Probably not. The argument for simplification is fairly standard for econo-
mists, but they all disagree on what to simplify. Perhaps the convention called to de-
velop a traditional tax policy would create a flat tax, and the convention members 
would be able to persuade the American people to agree. Then, years down the 
road the government expands through tariffs and estate taxes. The question then 
would be, if the idea were successful and the people of the United States were more 
satisfied with their government and how their government taxed them, would the in-
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herent problems with the taxes levied be worth the unity and perception of trans-
parency and fairness fostered? Yes, they would. Nobody can get everyone to agree 
on a particular tax philosophy, but there can exist a general appreciation for the sys-
tem that gave them what they have.
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